Comparative Analysis of Static Dynamic Probabilistic Risk Assessment by Mattenberger, Christopher J. et al.
Comparative Analysis of Static & Dynamic  
Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
Christopher J. Mattenberger, Science and Technology Corporation, NASA Ames Research Center 
Donovan L. Mathias, NASA Ames Research Center 
Susie Go, NASA Ames Research Center 
Key Words: Dynamic PRA, Risk-Informed Design, Space Exploration, Crewed Spacecraft
SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS 
This study examines three different methodologies for 
producing loss-of-mission (LOM) and loss-of-crew (LOC) 
risks estimates for probabilistic risk assessments (PRA) of 
crewed spacecraft. The three bottom-up, component-based 
PRA approaches examined are a traditional static fault-tree, a 
fault-tree hybrid, and a dynamic Monte Carlo simulation. 
These approaches were used to model a generic reaction 
control system thruster pod of a crewed spacecraft and 
mission, and a comparative analysis of the methods is 
presented.  
The methods are assessed in terms of the process of 
modeling a system, the actionable information produced for 
the design team, and the overall fidelity of the quantitative risk 
evaluation generated. The process of modeling a system is 
compared in terms of the effort required to generate the initial 
model, to update the model in response to design changes, and 
to support mass-versus-risk trade studies. The results are 
compared by examining the top-level LOM/LOC estimates 
and the relative risk driver rankings at the failure mode level. 
The fidelity of each modeling methodology is discussed in 
terms of its capability to handle real-world system dynamics 
such as cold-sparing, changes in mission operations due to 
loss of redundancy, and common cause failure modes.  
The paper also discusses the applicability of each 
methodology to the different phases of system development 
and shows that a single methodology may not be suitable for 
all of the many purposes and goals of a spacecraft PRA. A 
design process that follows a risk-informed design paradigm 
must have quantitative insight into the relative risks facing the 
system in order to balance the requirements placed upon the 
performance, mass, cost, and risk [2]. To arrive at a final 
design of a complex space system that is likely to meet all 
constraints, these requirements must be understood and traded 
against each other as early as the conceptual design phase in 
order to avoid costly re-designs or project cancellation [13]. 
During the conceptual design phase, the assessment 
methodology selected needs to respond rapidly to a changing 
design and provide accurate relative risk drivers with limited 
design detail. The fault-tree hybrid approach is shown to be 
best suited to these early assessment needs. As the design 
begins to mature, more precise insights are required to 
accurately discriminate between similar trade study options 
and identify the ones that can reduce overall risk most 
efficiently. To accomplish this, the level of design detail 
represented in the risk model must go beyond redundancy and 
nominal mission operations to include dynamic, time- and 
state-dependent system responses as well as diverse system 
capabilities. This is best accomplished using the dynamic 
simulation approach, since these phenomena are not easily 
captured by static methods. Ultimately, once the design has 
been finalized and the goal of the PRA is to provide design 
validation and requirement verification, more traditional, static 
fault-tree approaches may become as appropriate as the 
simulation method. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Implementation of risk-informed design allows the design 
team to balance the demands upon the system by considering 
risk on a co-equal basis with more traditional constraints such 
as mass, performance and cost [2]. Depending on the phase of 
the project life cycle and the goals of the risk analysis, various 
PRA methodologies could be used to produce quantitative risk 
estimates to enable such a process.  
In order to better understand the applicability various 
PRA methodologies, a comparative analysis has been 
performed using a generic reaction control system (RCS) 
thruster pod and mission [1] as a basis to elucidate the 
advantages and disadvantages of each methodology.  
The nominal mission under consideration is that of a 
crewed spacecraft visiting the International Space Station 
(ISS). The spacecraft is launched into orbit and then must 
utilize its onboard propulsion and RCS to rendezvous and 
dock with ISS 24 hours after launch. Once docked, the 
spacecraft remains on orbit for 210 days while the RCS is 
relatively quiescent. Once the spacecraft has completed its 
stay at ISS, or in the event of an abort from orbit, the 
spacecraft must once again utilizes its propulsion and RCS to 
perform de-orbit, entry, descent and landing operations to 
return the crew safely within 4.5 hours.  
The RCS thruster pod considered consists of two groups 
of three thrusters. Loss of any two thrusters in the same group 
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triggers an abort from orbit and ends the nominal mission, thus 
producing loss-of-mission (LOM), and the loss of an entire 
group triggers a loss-of-crew (LOC). A simplified schematic 
of this system is shown in Figure 1 with thrusters represented 
as blue triangles and isolation valves represented as blue 
boxes. The nominal operation of the system calls for “stand 
by” operation, with Thruster A to be fired until it experiences 
a failure, then Thruster B is fired until failure, and finally 
Thruster C would then be used to return the crew safely. 
Figure 1 – RCS Thruster Pod Configuration 
Each thruster consists of a fuel valve, an oxidizer valve, 
and an exciter. The valves failure modes consist of fails to 
open on demand, fails to close on demand, fails operationally 
while firing, and fails leaky over time. The exciter can fail off 
when powered on. The failure rate data is summarized in 
Table 1. These failure rates are from tables provided in the 
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers reliability data 
book [3]. 
Each fuel and oxidizer valve is backed up by an isolation 
valve, which is shared between two thrusters in different 
groups. The isolation valve is nominally open and only closes 
if one of two downstream valves has failed open or leaky. If 
the isolation valve fails to close or leaks, then a LOC is 
assumed to occur immediately. If the isolation valve 
successfully closes, then both downstream thrusters are 
deselected for the rest of the mission and the isolation valve 
must not leak in order to avoid LOC while crewed or loss-of-
vehicle (LOV) while docked to ISS. 
 
Failure Mode Failure Rate / Probability 
Valve – Fails to Open 2.05e-6 / demand 
Valve – Fails to Close 1.51e-6 / demand 
Valve – Fails Operationally 9.00e-7 / hour 
Valve – Fails Leaky 5.00e-8 / hour 
Exciter – Fails Off 1.69e-5 / hour 
Table 1 – Failure Rate Data 
Table 2 summarizes the risk exposure times and demands 
by mission phase for each thruster group in the pod. It is 
important to note that only the currently selected thruster is 
demanded to fire, while all other thrusters only accrue risk of 
Valve – Fails Leaky. This leads to uncertainty about how 
many demands and how much firing time will be accrued by 
each individual thruster in this cold-spare configuration during 
an actual mission. 
 
Failure Mode Pre-Docking Docked Post-Undock 
Valve –  
Fails to Open 
2,000 demands N/A 1,000 
demands 
Valve –  
Fails to Close 
2,000 demands N/A 1,000 
demands 
Valve – 
Fails 
Operationally 
2 hours N/A 1 hours 
Valve –  
Fails Leaky 
24 hours 5040 
hours 
4.5 hours 
Exciter –  
Fails Off 
24 hours N/A 4.5 hours 
Table 2 – Risk Exposure by Mission Phase 
Table 3 gives the common cause factor (CCF) values that 
were used for the RCS thrusters. These CCFs are based upon 
the Global Alpha Modeling Tool (GAMUT) [2] developed at 
NASA Johnson Space Center, which is based upon 
NUREG/CR-5485 [14] and NUREG/CR-5496 [15]. The 
values take into account an assumed staggered testing scheme 
where components are periodically inspected for indications of 
incipient failure modes and that these are demand-type 
components. 
 
Common Cause Group Size Common Cause Factor 
CCF of  2 of 3 0.04830 
CCF of  3 of 3 0.00517 
Table 3 – Common Cause Failure Conditional Probabilities 
2 METHODOLOGIES 
The fidelity of each modeling methodology is discussed 
in terms of its capability to handle the real-world system 
dynamics such as cold-sparing, changes in mission operations 
and system topology due to loss of redundancy, as well as 
common cause failure modes. Despite the common set of 
assumptions about concept of operation, risk exposure, and 
failure rates presented in Section 1, each method must make 
additional assumptions in order to produce a risk estimate. As 
such, each methodology provides a risk estimate for an 
approximate problem. The degree of the approximation versus 
the cost of obtaining the solution, in terms of risk analyst 
effort and time, is of key interest in determining the value 
provided to the design team. This value is a function of the 
stage of system development, design details available, and 
desired risk insights to be obtained. These factors are also 
discussed for each of the modeling approaches.  
A B C 
2.1  Static Fault-Tree Approach 
This approach utilized SAPHIRE 8 [5], developed at the 
Idaho National Laboratory, to construct a static fault-tree to 
capture the risk of the RCS thruster system. Multiple instances 
of the fault-tree were constructed to capture the various LOM 
and LOC end states, as a single model cannot capture both. 
Having multiple models of the same system can prove difficult 
to manage if the design is rapidly evolving, the turnaround 
time for performing trade studies is fast, or the inputs are in 
flux. 
The fault-tree basic events were calculated off-line and 
loaded into the model. A major assumption that must be made 
is determining how many demands each thruster must 
undertake successfully. Conservatively, it could be assumed 
that each thruster in a group must fire all 3,000 demands of the 
mission. However, this excessive conservatism produces 
unrealistically high risk estimates results that are not useful. 
Optimistically, it has been assumed that all three thrusters in a 
group each fire an equal amount. The true dynamic 
reallocation of firings after a thruster failure cannot be 
accounted for easily in a fault-tree. Similarly, incorporating 
dynamic reallocation of the firing and leakage times is also 
difficult. For example, an isolation valve should only begin to 
accrue leakage risk after a random thruster valve failure, but 
because the time of this failure is uncertain, the model must 
conservatively assume that the isolation valve must not leak 
for the entire mission duration.  
Moreover, the real-world reason to abort the nominal 
mission once the vehicle has become zero fault tolerant to 
LOC is to reduce the risk exposure to the crew and maximize 
the chance of returning them safely. However, the fault-tree 
approach does not allow for an elegant method of accounting 
for time-varying abort criteria in the results. In order to more 
accurately capture the time- and state-dependence of system 
functionalities and behaviors like dynamic reallocation of 
demands and aborts from orbit, an intractable number of event 
trees and corresponding fault-trees would need to be 
constructed. This would make the assessment prohibitively 
costly and unable to keep up with a rapidly evolving 
conceptual or preliminary design. However, using this type of 
method with a long development lead-time and conservative 
assumptions may be completely appropriate later in the critical 
design phase when the design has stabilized and the purpose 
of the assessment is to verify that it meets a risk requirement. 
Common cause failure modes are captured only when 
they would result directly in a LOM or LOC depending upon 
the end-state of the model. Thus, the model does not take into 
account mixed cases of both random and common cause 
failure modes combining to cause LOC.  
After the model is created, it must be solved using a 
specific method in the SAPHIRE program. Both the results 
and the computation time can vary widely, depending on the 
chosen solver method and the number of cutsets the solver 
method produces. The cutsets capture all of the approximate 
model’s possible failure modes and their calculated value 
deterministically, yielding an incredible amount of data that 
must be processed in order to provide actionable information 
to decision makers. 
Overall, this method produces a very precise solution, but 
to a very approximate problem. It is extremely useful for 
rigorously capturing all potential failure modes of the 
approximate problem, but suffers from a lack of 
responsiveness, which can be a determinate in rapidly 
evolving designs. 
2.2 Rapid Fault-Tree Hybrid Approach 
This approach utilizes the Ames Reliability Tool (ART), 
an Excel-based, implicit event-tree/fault-tree generator 
developed at NASA Ames Research Center based upon 
previous work [6]. The ART model deterministically produces 
estimates of LOM and LOC, focusing on risk-driving cutsets, 
which are expected to be those driven by common cause 
failure modes.  
The ART model has the ability to capture dynamic 
reallocation of demands after failure by using well-known 
‘cold spare’ or stand-by unit redundancy calculations [8]. This 
method is also able to capture the dynamic change in mission 
duration if an abort is triggered, and accurately captures the 
reduction in crew risk in the case of a degraded vehicle state. 
Additionally, only one model of the system needs to be built, 
as the ART is able to produce both LOM and LOC estimates 
from the same model with an extremely simple set of input 
fields. This method utilizes the built-in functionality of the 
ART to rapidly create models, enabling the risk analyst to 
work in real-time with designers.  
One limitation of this method is that, the ART is not able 
to handle all potential redundancy configurations and does not 
take into account cross-cutting failure modes between 
different types of components or different failure modes 
within a set of similar components. As such, this method does 
not account for cascade failure modes where a thruster failing 
open in one group propagates to deselect the corresponding 
thruster in the other group due to activation of the isolation 
valve. Furthermore, the ART model does not capture thruster 
loss due to combinations of failure modes, i.e., when one 
thruster fails to open while another thruster fails to close.  
However, the model is able to capture combinatorial 
mixed cases of both random failures and common cause 
failures within a specific failure mode or component. 
Depending on the system’s risk-driving failure modes, 
optimistically omitting these cutsets may or may not impact 
the overall results, as these cutsets contain only random 
failures, which are often lower probability than those 
containing common cause failures. Moreover, if the purpose 
of the risk assessment is to compare two competing designs, 
then it is conceivable that these failure modes will not be a 
difference that makes a difference in the design trade study.  
This method sacrifices precision in the estimate in order 
to respond more rapidly to the needs of the decision makers by 
providing relative risk estimates that capture the system’s key 
dynamics along with accurate relative rankings of the risk 
drivers. This allows the risk analyst to quickly produce a range 
of estimates based upon uncertain input data and determine the 
sensitivity of the estimate to the lack of design knowledge. 
2.3 Dynamic Monte Carlo Simulation Approach 
This approach utilizes commercially available Monte 
Carlo style simulation software called GoldSim [7]. The risk 
analyst must create an entirely new model, tailored to the 
specific design details of the system at hand. The approach 
seeks to include all dynamic interactions and dependencies 
between all components and failure modes, but at the cost of 
model complexity, model validation challenges and, 
ultimately, in run-time, depending on the number of 
realizations required to achieve the desired level of confidence 
in the reliability estimate.  
The models produced with this methodology have the 
ability to not only produce estimates of LOM and LOC, but 
also to produce estimates of LOV or crew-stranding at ISS. 
They can also provide scenario-based event timing 
information and data on successful missions or degraded 
vehicle states that do not trigger LOC, LOV, or LOM. These 
results can provide decision makers with great insight into 
maintenance concerns or the value of repair capability.  
In addition, unlike a traditional fault-tree, the dynamic 
approach is able to handle more complex and often more 
representative graph-like connections that occur in many space 
systems. The Monte Carlo approach inherently allows 
dynamic reallocation of demands and changes in system 
topology that may occur after failure. Common cause failure 
modes can be gracefully introduced into the model framework, 
which allows for complete simulation of the Multiple Greek 
Letter (MGL) [14] method. This allows common cause 
failures to be accounted for within any subset of the 
component group and not just failures of the entire group.  
Overall, this method most accurately captures the 
behavior of the systems and yields the greatest design insights, 
but comes at the cost of greatly increased model complexity. 
This complexity reduces the model’s ability to rapidly respond 
to an evolving design, makes debugging extremely 
challenging, increases computational run-times as the model 
grows. These factors can make the approach too costly to 
effectively support risk-informed design in early stages of 
development. However, recent advancements in cloud 
computing [9] and supercomputing [10] are reducing the time 
required to produce risk estimates at the desired confidence 
level and may enable these complex analysis techniques to 
become advantageous earlier in the design cycle. 
3 RESULTS 
System-level LOM and LOC estimates are presented 
along with rankings of system risk-drivers by failure mode. In 
addition, other meaningful model outputs produced by the 
dynamic simulation method, but not provided by the fault-tree 
or hybrid approach, are discussed. The ability of each method 
to provide actionable information for decision support is also 
explored. 
3.1 System-Level Risk Estimates 
LOM and LOC results are presented below in Figure 2. 
As expected, the hybrid model predicts lower risk than the 
simulation methodology due to the known limitations of the 
model, which does not account for cross-failure or cross-
component system failure modes. The hybrid model captures 
the majority of the LOM and LOC risk, which stems from 
CCF modes. The fault-tree results were calculated with both 
the ‘Min-Cut’ and ‘BDD’ solvers, which produced numerical 
results that differed by 2%. The fault-tree results are lower 
than those of the other methods due to the optimistic 
assumption about the duty cycle for each thruster necessitated 
by the inability to capture dynamic demand reallocation. Such 
an approach does not take into account the additional demands 
other thrusters must undertake to make-up for those of a failed 
group member. Contrarily, conservatively neglecting to 
include dynamic abort modes in the fault-tree has caused an 
increase in LOC risk. The dynamic approach results were 
obtained running 100,000 Monte Carlo simulations over a 
period of 11 hours on a quad-core Intel i5 processor. 
Determining the proper number of realizations is important to 
achieving converged results at the desired level of confidence. 
Producing high-fidelity results that capture all possible 
component connectivity and dynamic reallocation of RCS 
demands would require a prohibitive number of realizations. 
However, this degree of fidelity is not necessary to capture a 
converged estimate at the system level.  
Figure 2 – System-Level LOM/LOC Results by Model 
All of the methods considered can produce a top-level 
estimate of LOM and LOC. However, both the hybrid and 
fault-tree approach must make many assumptions to 
approximate the real-world system and, thus, underestimate 
LOM by 33% and 35%, respectively, and LOC by 26% and 
60%, respectively. Depending on the degree of dynamics and 
graph-like component interactions, such assumptions could 
introduce so much uncertainty into the results that the 
actionable information provided to the decision maker is 
minimal. If the omissions in modeling fidelity drive the risk of 
the system, then the results cannot be trusted on an absolute 
scale and relative risk results between competing design 
options cannot be utilized 
A major benefit of the simulation method is that it also 
records the time at which failure occurs. Such information can 
be extremely useful if the consequences of failure are time- 
and state-dependent, like during an ascent to orbit on a failing 
launch vehicle [11] or if increased time on orbit would enable 
additional scientific research and increased availability of the 
ISS. In particular, accounting for the temporal relations of 
failure initiators allows failures that occur while docked to ISS 
to be counted as LOV instead of LOC. The dynamic results 
can provide insight into degraded system states that do not 
lead to a LOM, but simply to a loss of redundancy and a 
continuation of the nominal mission. Such results can provide 
insights into expected observed component failure frequencies 
and aid in determining repair capabilities and maintenance 
schedules. 
3.2 System Risk Drivers 
Point estimates of system-level risk can be useful for 
comparing two different design options or determining if a 
design meets requirements. However, during the conceptual 
and preliminary phases of system development, insights into 
the system’s current risk drivers can provide designers with 
valuable guidance and feedback on how to most effectively 
increase system reliability and safety.  
Figure 4 – System Risk of LOM by Failure Mode for the 
Hybrid and Dynamic Methods 
LOM Results at the thruster failure mode level are 
provided in Figure 4 for the hybrid and dynamic methods and 
in Figure 5 for the fault-tree method.  
The fault-tree model results in these cases do not 
immediately yield actionable information to design teams, as 
the LOM and LOC fault-trees respectively produced 900 and 
3,956 cutsets of exact system failure modes, precisely 
capturing data about which components failed in what mode in 
the approximate system. For LOM, there exist only 24 unique 
classes of cutsets when the specificity of which exact 
component failed is removed. However, it is still difficult to 
directly apply the results in Figure 5 to provide actionable 
information to the design team. 
Similarly, the results from the dynamic simulation method 
must also be processed. The frequency of failure of each 
component during a mission with a LOM outcome is shown in 
Figure 4. Both the frequency of failure and frequency of 
failure leading to a LOM provide actionable information to the 
designer as to what failure modes are driving the system risk. 
However, a drawback of the dynamic method is that the true 
frequencies of failure modes not observed during any of the 
simulation realizations remain somewhat uncertain. In this 
case, there were no observed failures of the isolation valves, 
even though this failure mode does show up in both the hybrid 
and fault-tree results. 
The hybrid model immediately provides an ordered list of 
approximate risk drivers at the failure mode level as the 
approach neglects to model cross-component interactions. 
Since these cross-component cutsets do not drive the risk of 
the system, however, the primary risk drivers remain the same. 
Interestingly, the hybrid model predicts a much higher 
occurrence of valves failing leaky than both the fault-tree and 
dynamic methods. This is due to the conservative assumption 
that the diverse leak protection provided by the isolation 
valves must be reliable for the entire mission, since the 
existing ART model is not able to capture this dynamic 
behavior explicitly. 
Figure 4– System Risk of LOM by Failure Mode for the Fault-
Tree Method 
Providing risk data at the failure-mode level can yield 
much richer insights into how system safety and reliability can 
be improved most efficiently. In this case, it is clear that the 
dominant failure modes of the system are Valve - Fails to 
Open and Valve - Fails to Close. The fault-tree results do 
benefit by providing the information that it is common cause 
failures of this failure mode that drive system risk. Thus, a 
designer would want to spend precious project resources, such 
as mass, to protect against this failure mode by backing up 
these functions redundantly or reducing the susceptibility of 
these components to common cause failures.  
The comparative results presented here were driven by 
common cause failures of the fails-to-open and fails-to-close 
thruster failure modes. As such, it would be interesting to 
perform a sensitivity analysis of the results to changes in the 
common cause factors and demand failure probabilities of 
these risk drivers to determine the impacts on each method’s 
risk estimates. In addition, uncertainty analysis could be 
included for each methodology to further illustrate their 
advantages and limitations. Ideally, the system under 
consideration should be expanded to increase the scope and 
complexity of system interactions and dynamics to better 
reflect complex, real-world space systems. 
4 DISCUSSION 
The applicability of each methodology to the different 
phases of system development can now be discussed in light 
of the benefits and drawbacks presented in the previous 
section.  
The methodology selected during the conceptual design 
phase needs to respond rapidly to a changing design and 
provide accurate relative risk drivers with limited design 
detail. The methodology best suited to providing such insights 
is the rapid fault-tree hybrid approach. Interestingly, many of 
the limitations associated with the hybrid approach are 
minimized early in the system development life cycle because 
the precise design details about cross strapping and component 
connectivity are still yet to be determined. Moreover, the 
purpose of PRA during the conceptual design phase is to 
provide the design teams with increased insight to guide 
design decision. Thus, most PRA in this phase will be of a 
relative nature and a precise, absolute risk estimate is not as 
important as the relative differences between multiple, 
competing design options. Furthermore, at this phase of 
development, the PRA is often more concerned with reliability 
potential rather than ‘as drawn’ reliability. 
As the design begins to mature, more precise insights are 
required to accurately discriminate between similar trade study 
options and identify the factors that can most efficiently 
reduce overall risk. Additionally, risk estimates must be 
provided to discriminate between design options in completely 
unrelated subsystems, so having accurate absolute risk 
estimates becomes of paramount importance. The design 
trades will also start to become more subtly nuanced and 
require precise representations of actual real-world system 
operation. To accomplish this, the level of design detail 
represented in the risk model must go beyond redundancy and 
nominal mission operations to include dynamic, time- and 
state-dependent system responses as well as diverse system 
capabilities. The dynamic methodology is best suited to this 
phase of development, as many risk-driving and risk-
differentiating phenomena are not easily captured by static 
methods.  
Ultimately, once the design has been finalized and the 
goal of the PRA is to provide design validation and 
requirement verification, more traditional, static fault-tree 
approaches may become as appropriate as the simulation 
method. At this point in the design cycle, the goal of the PRA 
is often to show that the system meets requirements or validate 
the design by exhaustively searching for unintended system 
failure modes or cutsets that are not intuitively obvious and 
are very easy for a fault-tree to discover. Thus, making overly 
conservative assumptions can be completely valid. Moreover, 
since the questions being asked of the PRA are much broader 
and less specific, the PRA does not have to provide decision 
makers with as much detailed insight in such a rapid fashion.  
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Pod 
  
Group 
Failure Mode Failure Rate / Probability 
Valve – Fails to Open 2.05e-6 / demand 
Valve – Fails to Close 1.51e-6 / demand 
Valve – Fails Operationally 9.00e-7 / hour 
Valve – Fails Leaky 5.00e-8 / hour 
Exciter – Fails Off 1.69e-5 / hour 
Failure Mode Pre-Docking Docked Post-Undock 
Valve – Fails to Open 2000 demands N/A 1000 demands 
Valve – Fails to Close 2000 demands N/A 1000 demands 
Valve – Fails Operationally 2 hours N/A 1 hours 
Valve – Fails Leaky 24 hours 5040 hours 4.5 hours 
Exciter – Fails Off 24 hours N/A 4.5 hours 
Common Cause Group Size Common Cause Factor 
CCF of  2 of 3 0.0483 
CCF of  3 of 3 0.00517 
  
  
  
Thruster 
  
Fuel 
Valve 
Oxidizer 
Valve 
Exciter 
2x 
Isolation 
Valve 
Methodologies 
5 
Each approach provides solutions to approximate problems 
Fault-Tree 
Dynamic 
Hybrid 
Comparison of Results
6 
Risk model insights must provide actionable information to decision makers 
System Life Cycle 
• Conceptual Design Phase 
− Design evolves rapidly 
− Lack of precise design details 
− Trades performed at higher levels of design or architecture 
− Focus is on Reliability Potential 
 
• Preliminary Design Phase 
− Design continues to evolve rapidly 
− Additional design details become available 
− Trades performed at lower levels of design or architecture 
− Trades must discriminate between closely related system options  
− Focus begins to shift from Reliability Potential to “As Drawn” 
 
• Critical Design Phase 
− Design has begun to crystalize 
− Complete design details become available 
− Part selection, procurement, test plan enter trade space 
− Focus is entirely “As Drawn” 
 
• Operational Phase 
− Real-world data about system available 
− Maintenance enters trade space 
− Real-time decision support 
− Focus is entirely “As Operated” and “As Built” 
 
7 
Summary & Conclusions 
• Hybrid Approach 
− Most well suited for conceptual and preliminary designs 
− Responds rapidly to changing design 
− Complete design details not necessary 
− Does not capture all system failure modes 
 
• Dynamic Approach 
− Most well suited for preliminary, critical and operational designs 
− Provides greater design insights 
− Captures dynamic behavior 
− Captures interconnectivity and time- / state- dependencies among subsystems 
− Difficult to create new models and validate 
 
• Traditional Fault-Tree Approach 
− Most well suited for critical designs 
− Allows for conservative assumptions to capture dynamics 
− Design has crystalized so it has a chance to keep up 
− Questions at this phase are higher level 
 
 
8 
Q & A 
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